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What is a political trial? There have not been many 
attempts to explain or define the concept. By far the 
best treatment of the subject is by Otto Kirchheimer in a 
book titled Political Justice. Yet even Kirchheimer is not 
entirely clear about what a political trial is: he defines it 
as a judicial trial which is directly involved with the 
struggle for political power. That is rather vague. Several 
weeks ago, Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, 
referred to political trials-one of the first justices ever 
to mention the term-but he did not explain what they 
were. Instead, he gave five examples from American 
history of what he considered to be political trials. 
Those were: the Haymarket trial; the Debs trial in con-
necticut with the Pullman strike; the Mooney-Billings 
case; the Sacco-Vanzetti trial; and the Smith Act prose-
cution of Dennis. I think that we would probably all 
agree that those were political trials. Let me, however, 
go a little beyond the examples and indicate some of the 
situations in which a political trial occurs. 
I will be speaking here only in the context of the crim-
inal law, because criminal indictments are the tools most 
often used by the government to counter political oppo-
sition. The clearest case is a trial for treason or conspira-
cy to overthrow the government. We haven't had one of 
those in American history since the trial of Aaron Burr. 
In modern times, prosecution for opposition to the gov-
ernment is more likely to take the form of a trial for 
political expression-a prosecution of the members of a 
radical political movement, based not upon their actions 
but upon the expression of their position. The Debs 
sedition case and the Smith Act cases are good examples. 
The Coffin-Spock prosecution rested almost entirely 
upon political speech, as did the trial of the Chicago 
Seven. 
Another situation in which a political trial might oc-
cur is where a common crime-an orthodox crime-is 
committed for political purposes and the attempt to 
punish that crime involves an attempt to injure or harass 
the political movement that is involved. I think an exam-
ple might be the Debs Pullman case, where Debs engaged 
in certain acts which were in pursuit of a basic political 
effort to organize labor. Other examples might be the 
accusation against Alger Hiss for engaging in espionage 
for political purposes and the Rosenberg-Sobell prose-
cution. 
A third situation involves an ordinary crime which on 
its face is not connected with political issues or com-
mitted for political purposes. Its political implications 
derive from the facts that the person charged with the 
crime is prominent in a political movement and that one 
of the objectives of the prosecution is to destroy or in-
jure that movement. The issue becomes not only what 
was done but also the political motivation behind the 
prosecution. In the Mooney-Billings case, the crime was 
bombing, but the prosecution of two members of a radi-
cal political movement raised serious issues concerning 
the motivation and merits of the prosecution. In the 
Sacco-Vanzetti case, the crime was simple armed rob-
bery, but the prosecution and conviction of two radicals 
living in a period of considerable popular hostility to 
their views raised serious questions about the validity of 
the prosecution and the fairnesss of the trial. 
Thus, the fact that the defendants in the New Haven 
Panther trial are charged with murder is not decisive on 
the question whether it is a political trial. The basic 
question is whether there are issues in the case which, 
whether the prosecution desires it or not, go beyond the 
narrow judicial issues of the relation of the individual 
person to the events and raise controversial political 
questions. For example, the Panther case has to be 
placed in the context of a consistent attack on a political 
party made, over a period of time, by police depart-
ments throughout the country and perhaps with the aid 
of federal agencies-an attack which has resulted in the 
deaths of over twenty Panthers and a number of police-
men. The case has to be viewed in the context of harass-
ment and raids conducted in an effort to wipe out a 
party which has challenged the status quo in this coun-
try. Given this context, it is clear that there are issues in 
this case, whether or not anyone wants to recognize 
them, which go beyond the traditional legal issues of 
who did what to whom under what circumstances. 
Moreover, in the Panther case, we have charges of a 
most heinous nature brought against a group of people 
who are outside the affluent society. Add to that the 
fact that the defendants are black. Everyone who knows 
the situation knows that justice for black and for poor 
people in our courts is not the same as justice for white 
and for well-to-do people. In addition, the defendants 
are engaged in a militant political operation, are actively 
challenging police control of the ghetto and are actively 
presenting a radical view of society that is threatening to 
many people in our society. Add to that the fact that for 
almost a year, the prosecution's case has been presented 
to the people of this community day after day, while the 
defense case has not been and cannot be so presented. 




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1971
Let me now say something about the characteristics of 
a political trial. First, the government does not acknowl-
edge the political nature of the trial. Under no circum-
stances will government officials admit that a trial is 
political. They insist on its conventionality: this is a 
murder; they have to find out who committed the mur-
der; the case will be handled by the usual legal process; 
and that process will arrive at the correct result. They 
assume, indeed insist, that the normal operation of the 
judicial system will continue in conventional fashion. 
There are reasons why the government will not recog-
nize openly those aspects of a judicial proceeding which 
transcend the narrow legal issues as visualized by the 
legal system and which involve the play of political 
forces. Usually, the government is interested in maintain-
ing the status quo and therefore insists upon everybody 
playing the game according to the established rules. Fur-
thermore, if the government is in fact using the judicial 
process for illegitimate purposes, it has no inclination to 
admit such a departure from its obligations. 
Secondly, if in actuality the government does attempt 
to use the proceeding as a political weapon against a 
political movement, it may do that in various ways. It 
may appeal to the popular hostility against the move-
ment, as in the Smith Act cases. It may exploit the asso-
ciation of particular defendants with an unpopular 
cause. It may attempt to establish an historical record to 
justify its own position. It may try to win popular sup-
port either by demonstrating the unsavory character of 
the opposition or by arousing fears in the public mind 
about the aims of the opposition. And it uses special 
methods and applies special pressures to do these things. 
It does not approach the case in a "run-of-the-mill" fash-
ion but rather undertakes special efforts towards politi-
cal ends. 
Thirdly, what is the defense reaction to such a situa-
tion? Frequently, the defendants attempt to use the 
judicial proceedings to raise political issues. In a sense, 
they have no other choice, since, in their view, the real 
issues extend to the political questions. The objective of 
the defense may be merely to set the historical record 
straight, but more often it undertakes to force public 
consideration of what it sees as the major issues in the 
case. In the Coffin-Spock case, for example, the defen-
dants were very interested in raising the issue of the 
legality and morality of the Vietnam War. They were 
largely unsuccessful in their efforts, but the attempt was 
made. In the Chicago conspiracy case, I would say that 
one of the aims of the defense was to expose the corrup-
tion, incompetence and stupidity of our whole society, 
and they did a pretty good job of doing it. 
In the New Haven case, the Panthers are certainly in-
terested in exposing the defects in our system of justice, 
especially as it applies to the poor and the black; in ex-
posing the political basis of police attacks upon them; 
and in making their own program of political action 
clear to the rest of the country. 
What methods are available to the defense to raise 
these issues? By definition, the issues are not part of an 
ordinary legal defense; they must be dragged in, one way 
or another. This can be done inside the courtroom or 
outside of it. Inside the courtroom, the defense may 
attempt to raise the issues within the confines of strict 
legal procedure, though opportunities to do so are lim-
ited. The very nature of the judicial system restricts a 
case to the narrow legal issues, and this precludes those 
issues which the defense may feel are most important. 
What can be done inside the courtroom is quite circum-
scribed, and therefore much of the defense activity must 
take place outside the courtroom. I'll get to that shortly. 
But Jet me add two more important characteristics of a 
political case. 
Fourthly, and of special interest to law students, the 
defense lawyers are often caught in a very difficult posi-
tion. An immediate tension arises between the legitimate 
interests of their clients and their professional responsi-
bility to conduct the trial in accordance with traditional 
modes of legal procedure. In_ effect, the Canons of Ethics 
places an obligation on the attorney to make every 
effort to keep the defense within established bound-
aries-to present the defense and play the game by what 
are, in essence, the government's rules. The defense law-
yer is supposed to be the spokesman for the legal system 
as well as the spokesman for the defense. He is, there-
fore, inevitably in a much unenvied position, as Bill 
Kunstler can tell you. 
Finally, a political case is not likely to be resolved with 
the end of the trial. Political trials characteristically keep 
on going. The Mooney case continued for years; the 
Debs case continued as long as he was jailed; the Rosen-
berg and Sacco-Vanzetti cases are still going. A legal 
conviction simply does not settle the political issues, and 
these issues remain as Jong as the situation which gave 
rise to them remains. In a non-political case, on the 
other hand, the legal decision usually settles the case, for 
the legal system is established for that purpose and can 
ordinarily accomplish it. 
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What, then, does all this imply with respect to political 
activity surrounding the trial? Since the political issues 
can seldom be addressed inside the courtroom, political 
activity outside of it is almost inevitable, unless, of 
course, it is suppressed. Such activity may or may not be 
effective in advancing the cause of the defense either 
legally or politically. For example, the attempts by the 
Communist Party to arouse political support in the 
Smith Act cases did not help very much. On the other 
hand, the support for the Chicago defendants probably 
had some significant impact. 
In any event, political activity in connection with a 
trial of this sort is clearly within the general system of 
freedom of expression and within the democratic pro-
cess. The courts are not en ti tied to be isolated from pub-
lic criticism. The legislature is not so isolated; the execu-
tive is not so isolated; and the courts should not claim 
the privilege to operate in isolation. To a certain extent, 
of course, the judicial system is intended to remain out-
side of the mainstream of political activity, and this 
creates a tension between the function of the judicial 
system and the function of the political system. Yet, 
however this tension is resolved, the courts are not en-
titled to immunity from public scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court has recognized this. In the Harry 
Bridges case, for instance, the Court said that in spite of 
the fact that political expression might operate to cast 
disrespect upon the judicial system or result in criticism 
of the courts, the government had no power to regulate 
such expression. 
Furthermore, in a broad sense the impact of public 
response on the courts is crucial. The courts do not 
weigh all the facts-only those that are recognized as 
relevant under the strict judicial rules. They tend to rely 
on assumptions, on traditions and on methods built up 
over the years without fully considering their actions or 
ihe new issues that arise. It is therefore healthy and ef-
fective to hold them to account by public scrutiny of 
their activities. 
There are limits to such public scrutiny, of course. The 
limits are those imposed by a democratic system. As far 
as activity outside the courtroom is concerned, it seems 
to me that the limits are essentially those of non-vio-
lence and non-coercion. None of us wan ts a judicial sys-
tem that is dominated by force. None of us wants a judi-
cial system that is coerced or mob-dominated. Clearly, in 
regard to the New Haven Panther trial, political activity 
should stay within the democratic process and not ex-
tend to violence or coercion. That leaves, I believe, a 
certain amount of room for civil disobedience-which I 
construe to be non-violent. 
If you consider yourself outside the democratic sys-
tem, then your activity is, of course, limited only by 
political considerations. In such a case as this, however, 
it seems to me that the immediate effect of political 
violence is likely to be repression. I think that an aban-
donment of the judicial system through violence or coer-
cion and an abandonment of the system of free expre~­
sion would simply result, at least for the time being, in 
the advent of a police state. On the other hand, a dem-
onstration within the democratic tradition is a legiti-
mate, healthy form of political activity and might, I 
should hope, be substantially effective. 
To call the New Haven Panther trial a political trial 
does not mean to me that the trial should be called off 
and the indictments dropped. Since there are legal issues 
involved as well as political ones, the legal issues have to 
be settled by the judicial process. It is the only process 
which we have which can settle them, and the alternative 
is that the issue be decided in the streets. That, from my 
point of view, would be worse than the dangers of an 
unfair trial. 
Yet the implications of the factors which make this 
trial a political trial are, in my mind, clear. Given these 
facts, there is serious doubt that a fair trial can be se-
cured. The only possible way for that to happen is for 
the people of the community to be constantly aware of 
what is going on in the courtroom, to understand as 
much of it as possible, to scrutinize the proceedings with 
particular care and to insist loudly and repeatedly upon 
justice in the courtroom. That is not only the obligation 
of the defense but our obligation as well. 
3
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Charles Reich 
Rather than comment directly on Professor Emerson's 
speech, I think I will talk about the problem in my own 
way for a little while. It seems to me that the underlying 
problem could be called 'the politicization of law' -the 
use of law and the legal system as an instrument in polit-
ical warfare. Needless to say, law is always a choice of 
values. When you choose to protect free speech, you are 
making a choice of political values. In dealing with the 
controversies that come into court, the law embraces 
many kinds of political issues-from segregation cases to 
the regulation of corporations. When those controversies 
take place within a framework of agreed values, then it 
seems to me that the law has not been politicized. For 
example, we all agree that people in this country should 
be treated equally by the government. Within that con-
sensus, there is room for disagreement as to what consti-
tutes 'equal,' but the controversy can take place within 
the system of law. Or, we make certain agreements 
about what a corporation may or may not do, and the 
law can deal with the question of what fits within that. 
The argument takes place within the agreed structure of 
law and values; the law is not, in my definition, politi-
cized thereby. 
The politicization of the law occurs when some of the 
people involved do not agree with the other people 
about the framework itself, when some people are out-
siders to the system. A good indication that the law is 
politicized is that the lawyers themselves are placed in 
professional jeopardy for presenting a particular side of a 
case. When people who undertake to present one side are 
condemned for it, one can see that the system no longer 
embraces all points of view. 
Professor Emerson has provided some examples of 
politicized law; I'll add a few more. One clear example 
arises when a trial takes place in a forum which is not 
empowered to hold one. When a Congressional investiga-
tion, for example, turns into a trial of the investigated, 
you have the politicized use of law. The most famous 
instances of this occurred, of course, during the McCar-
thy years. 
A second example occurs when ideas are suppressed 
regardless of the nature of the over-riding law involved. 
For example, if people are thrown out of public housing 
or cut off from welfare because of their beliefs-because 
they are communists or they are this or that-you have a 
politicized use of the law, since such factors are not ordi-
narily relevant criteria for such decisions. The political 
use of non-political 1aw-selective traffic enforcements 
or selective income tax enforcement, for instance-is a 
very important type of politicized law. It is the essence 
of what I call 'politicized law' that ordinary day-to-day 
9 
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laws suddenly get used for political ends. That is a great-
er threat to the legal system than a law which provides 
that no communist shall make a speech. At least the 
latter has emerged out of the system, is the result of the 
democratic process. Under my definition, it is still a 
politicized use of the law, but is not as great a distortion 
of the system as applying a so-called neutral law select-
ively to politically unpopular persons. 
A final clear-cut example seems to me to be the use of 
the law to suppress culture in one way or another. A 
rock festival is denied a permit, a commune is driven out 
of town because of various building requirements and so 
forth. These represent assaults not merely on ideas but 
on a whole culture. 
lfwe look at this in a broader context, we might agree 
that the politicization of the law comes about, in part, 
because law is used in our society for every conceivable 
purpose. while other societies employ different instru-
mentalities to effect diverse ends. In other words, every 
time we want to establish any kind of policy in this 
country-great. small or trivial-we use laws. When we do 
that, we push law toward being an instrument of what-
ever policy prevails at the moment. Before I discuss the 
implications of this in today's society, let me provide 
two basic characteristics about the use of politicized law. 
First, as Professor Emerson mentioned, a hallmark of 
the political use of the law is the rigid insistence of all 
those involved that nothing unusual is going on. During 
the McCarthy era. this willful blindness occurred at sev-
eral levels. First. the people who participated, a Congress-
man or a prosecutor. insisted that everything was nor-
mal. Second. the judges, particularly the justices of the 
appellate courts, insisted that you could not look behind 
the face of the law or the face of the prosecution. The 
rhetoric of the time was that we cannot question the 
intent of Congress in this matter: it looks normal on its 
face: we cannot go behind that: we will not look to mo-
tives. There was a kind of high-blown, self-righteous 
rhetoric, during this period. which maintained that ev-
eryone must stay within his function. And so the whole 
nature of the thing-which was obvious to everyone-was 
denied by all. Third, legal scholarship agreed that such 
issues must be ignored. The system had to be considered 
legitimate. No one dared to question the proceedings, 
because the form and appearance was normal. A great 
deal of scholarship was devoted to trying to maintain 
that myth. 
Second, when the law is used for political ends, the 
make-up of the judicial system becomes crucial. The 
judicial system has always been considered a patron and 
branch of our political system. Whoever the 'ins' are 
appoint their men as judges-and so all our judges are 
Democrats or Republicans. Indeed in New York City, 
for example, the judiciary has become a part of the 
club-house system, and one of the qualifications for 
being a state Supreme Court justice is that a man must 
have been political leader of his district, a district capt-
ain say. One of the oddest things in New York State 
practice is that the law clerks turn out to be district cap-
tains. They don't know a thing about being a clerk in the 
practical sense; they are law clerks for political reasons. 
Back in the good old days of Tammany, that was all fun 
and games; it was the 'ins' against the 'outs' and turkey 
at Thanksgiving. But when society begins to be deeply 
divided about political questions, it loses its quaint hu-
mor. 
That brings me to my basic point. The problem whiCh 
is now straining the legal system-perhaps beyond its 
capacity to respond-is that we have become in a pro-
found sense two nations, two cultures, as a result of the 
social revolution which is now taking place. In part, it is 
a revolution of those who have been left out of the sys-
tem and who are challenging that system. In part, it is a 
revolution of those who have had enough of the system 
and want out-or want to change it. We are no longer a 
society in which there is much agreement about basic 
values. When you have two nations, the simplest case, 
such as the coffee house case in South Carolina, becomes 
intensely political. That was a trial of some operators of 
a GI coffee house who allegedly were creating a nui-
sance. If they were creating a nuisance, they should have 
gotten 30 days in jail or an order to cease and desist. But 
instead, they got six years in prison-practically a death 
sentence as far as their development is concerned. At a 
point like this, law becomes simply an arsenal in a war 
between one group and another in our society. 
In response to this trend, it seems to me that there are 
two alternatives. Either everything at issue must be an 
issue in the trial, or extraneous issues cannot be allowed 
to have any influence on the proceedings. For example, 
in the coffee house case, the judge said that the defen-
dants were an evil influence on youth. Now if that is 
going to be a factor in his decision, it should be at issue 
in the trial. What we cannot allow is for the courts to 
follow the pattern of the I 950's and refuse to admit that 
this kind of question exists when, in fact, it influences 
the proceedings. We cannot say that since the trial was 
regular on its face, its legitimacy cannot be questioned. 
I believe that if, ultimately, there is to be a system of 
law, all the issues that divide us have to be brought 
within a system which represents some kind of agree-
ment among all. Perhaps that is not an obtainable ideal 
any more. At present, the most important issues have 
been pushed outside of the system; we must attempt to 
refashion that system so that those issues can be consid-
ered. In the Panther trial, I take it, there is to be an at-
tempt both inside and outside the courtroom to make 
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Question: Professor Emerson, would you care to com-
ment on Professor Reich's comments? 
Mr. Emerson: Firs.t, I th.ink that the concept of politi-
cized law is somewhat broader than the concept which I 
was advancing of the political trial. At this time, I hesi-
tate to define a political trial precisely. But for the pur-
poses of the present discussion, I think that the term 
should at least be limited to Kirchheimer's definition of 
the political trial as a direct struggle or confrontation 
between the government and defendants over political 
power or the existence of a political movement. The 
concept of politicized law extends somewhat beyond 
that. 
Second, I noted that the defendants could attempt to 
restrict the issues in the trial to the narrow legal ques-
tions; Professor Reich states that their other choice is to 
demand that the court consider all of the issues. I find 
that questionable, because it does not seem to me that 
many of such issues are of the kind which can be consid-
ered by the judicial system. Therefore, I am not certain 
that the defendants have such a choice or that, if they 
do have it, the court will let them exercise it. Thus, I see 
the problem more in terms of a choice between restrict-
ing the issues to the narrow legal issues and raising the 
broader issues outside of the courtroom. 
Finally, I completely agree that the problem of politi-
cized law becomes acute in the present type of situation 
with the development of what are, in effect, two cul-
tures or nations. Obviously, as common understanding 
or a common value system becomes less widespread or 
cohesive, more and more political issues are raised, and 
the legal system is less and less able to handle them ef-
fectively. 
Question: Professor Reich, would you illustrate how you 
would bring within the rule of law the issues which you 
see affecting the Panther case. 
Mr. Reich: Since we are limited to information in the 
newspaper, that is rather difficult. One thing that has 
come out is the process by which the grand jury was 
selected. If the paper is to be believed, there is some-
thing terribly friendly about the way in which the sheriff 
selected the grand jury. That kind of thing stops being 
funny small-town politics in a case like this and becomes 
instead a highly political thing. So there is at least the 
opportunity to insist that different standards be applied 
and that the grand jury have some degree of representa-
tiveness. 
We do not know what evidence will be offered or what 
comments the prosecutor or judge might make. What I 
would emphasize, with Professor Emerson, is the neces-
sity for a kind of awareness and scrutiny, a willingness to 
watch out for things which in ordinary trials are taken 
for granted but which will have political significance in 
this trial. 
Personally, I do not think that this is a good opportu-
nity for the lawyers to defend the Panther way of life, 
unless the prosecution puts it in issue. This is a difficult 
case, because the charge is murder, and murder is one of 
the things which we still tend to agree upon as a total 
society. Generally, then, the issues in this case are issues 
basic to a fair trial-if you believe such a thing is possi-
ble. If you think that no fair trial for a murder can take 
place, then, I guess, you have to reject the system. 
Question: Could you elaborate on your two-nation con-
cept. You are not talking about a racially bifurcated 
country are you? 
Mr. Reich: We are not talking about two nations, one 
black and one white. The split might more accurately be 
described, I guess, as between those over thirty and 
those under thirty. Essentially, the concept assumes that 
there is a substantial group in the society that is con-
vinced of the dishonesty, corruption and inefficiency of 
the present system, and is so alienated that it is prepared 
to seek something en ti rely new. Thus, the split is based 
upon the search for a whole new value structure. The 
two nations simply do not share the same value sys-
tem-and even if their basic values are the same, they do 
not share them as they are reflected in the present insti-
tutional arrangements. 
Question: Wouldn't you say that to some extent, the law 
is always used as an instrument for political coercion, 
and is always 'political'? 
Mr. Emerson: I think so. I think that any legal system 
will tend to enforce the views and interests of the domi-
nant group in the society. After a revolution, that is 
quite clear; as time passes, str°uctures and rules become 
assumed and it is more difficult to determine whether 
they are 'political' or 'legal.' That is one of the problems 
which I have with Professor Reich's concept of the polit-
icization of law. The law is not an abstract thing. It is 
bound up closely with the community and the exercise 
of power; inevitably, it is part of the general political 
process. Thus, it is very difficult to decide at what point 
the legal system is operating on its own, as it were, and 
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Mr. Reich: The difference, I believe, is between contro-
versy within the defined framework and controversy 
outside of it. Going back to the coffee house, for ex-
ample, a disagreement about the standards of acceptable 
noise or cleanliness can be adjudicated. Moreover, the 
legal system can easily embrace the concept that people 
have different ideas and that all have a right to express 
those ideas peaceably. If that were true in the coffee 
house case, then you would not have a political use of 
the law. Six years in prison is not the normal conse-
quence of dirty coffee cups. 
Question: I am not clear on how it is possible to say that 
murder can be considered non-political. It seems to me 
that our ideas about murder are very political. It is 
deemed perfectly acceptable for the police to shoot the 
Panthers or to shoot looters. It is all right, in a normal 
situation, for someone to defend himself. It is consid-
ered laudable that soldiers shoot the 'enemy' in Viet-
nam, or drop bombs on 'enemy' civilian populations. All 
of these are very political concepts. 
Mr. Reich: I would not say that the prevailing value sys-
tem in this country condones a policeman's act of 
shooting a Panther. Basically, it seems to me that there is 
general agreement that you ought not murder someone 
else. The question of killing in a war is somewhat differ-
ent and is becoming more and more a question of con-
troversy. Still, it seems to me that a judicial system can 
handle a question of who killed whom. 
Questioner: I am not certain that I agree with that fact. I 
don't think that such a consensus exists in this country. 
Otherwise, there would be a greater outcry when police 
shoot looters or protesters, and police would be tried in 
the legal system also. 
Mr. Reich: If there is no agreement on the question of 
murder, then we are outside the legal system entirely. 
You may be in a position where you must repudiate the 
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Otis Cochran 
On several occasions during the past few months, I 
have spoken before groups here and in other cities, 
giving my own views and the views of the Black Ameri-
can Law Students Association on the broad questions of 
reform of the judicial process and on the more specific 
questions concerning the procedures used in the arrests 
and trials of the Black Panthers. On some of those issues, 
our opinions have been shared by many of the students 
and faculty members of this institution. Most of us, for 
example, have deplored what seemed to be efforts by 
President Nixon to demean the Supreme Court and to 
undermine respect for the entire judicial system by his 
appointments to the Court and by comments he and his 
Attorney General have made concerning certain cases 
pending in the courts. 
I do not intend to review the evidence on these mat-
ters-it is familiar enough to all of us. I mention it only 
because I believe that it cannot be emphasized too 
strongly that what has been going on here in New Haven 
during this spring of 1970 is not an isolated event, an 
accidental aberration from the general course that Amer-
ican society has taken during the late l 960's and early 
1970's. This trial is part of a much larger tale of repres-
sion and intimidation, and, while we applaud the con-
cern that many people at Yale University have demon-
strated in recent weeks, we would remind you that this 
is not the first time that the fundamental civil rights of 
black Americans have been violated in the name of a 
so-called 'fair' and 'impartial' judicial process. I want to 
emphasize that I am talking about the civil rights of 
American citizens. We hear so much talk about the Black 
Panthers that it is easy to forget that we are dealing with 
a group of American citizens-supposedly guaranteed the 
same privileges and immunitites, the same equal protec-
tion of the laws, as any other group of citizens in this 
country. I hope that with all the talk about the political 
dimensions of these events, none of us will lose sight of 
the human dimension. They are our fellow citizens, born 
in those same ghettos that agitate all good liberals, edu-
cated in the same segregated ·and inferior schools that 
bother the Yale community, and subjected to the same 
kinds of massive and systematic exploitation and oppres-
sion that seared the consciences of right-thinking Ameri-
cans when it was Martin Luther King or Medgar Evers or 
Fannie Lou Hamer who were d"oing the complaining and 
making the appeals for fairness and justice. Now it is the 
Black Panthers who are making the plea for fairness and 
justice, and it is imperative that we listen to them as 
American citizens and not simply as people who wear 
the easily applied label of the Black Panthers. 
With this background, then, let me say a few words 
about this trial in particular. There has been a good deal 
of debate as to whether this is a political trial. Those 
who say it is not are simply taking too narrow a view of 
the matter. It would take a person of remarkable naivete 
to contend that there has been no pattern of police ha-
rassment of the Panthers in the last two years; it would 
take extraordinary gullibility to believe that every arrest 
made has been justified, that every charge brought has 
been grounded on reasonable evidence, that every pre-
trial detention or every bail figure set has been the pro-
duct of a fair and impartial inquiry. And it would take a 
person of surpassing faith in our police departments to 
believe that there has never been manufactured evidence, 
that no agents have ever been planted as provocateurs or 
that no dummy informers have ever been created out of 
thin air. 
That Alex Rackley was murdered is not open to 
doubt; and whether some of those charged with partici-
pating in the crime may have been involved is a matter 
yet to be settled. But it is also indisputable that the po-
lice and prosecution have cast their nets so widely in this 
case, have used evidence of such dubious constitution-
ality, have relied on witnesses of such questionable reli-
ability, and have levelled their charges so indiscrimi-
nately that the political nature of the trial stands out 
clearly. For one must ask the very fundamental ques-
tion: are the law enforcement agencies of this state more 
interested in solving the murder of Alex Rackley and 
bringing the guilty to justice, or are they more interested 
in taking part in what has become a nation-wide cam-
paign to wreck the Black Panther party, to decimate its 
leadership and to exterminate once and for all its grow-
ing influence among the black people-and among many 
white people-of this country? Perhaps this trial will be 
conducted with such impeccable fairness and impar-
tiality that those questions can be answered definitely 
and satisfactorily. But there is very little in the history 
of the past few months to lead anyone to believe the 
American courts are capable of giving controversial de-
fendants full, fair, impartial and just hearings. Let us 
hope that New Haven will prove an exception. But let us 
also recognize that those who deny altogether the polit-
ical aspects of this trial are living in a dreamland of their 
own creation-a dreamland that bears little resemblance 
to the United States of America. 
So the fact of the trial has confronted us, and we have 
been forced to respond. The president of Yale University 
has voiced his skepticism that the Panthers can get a fair 
trial anywhere in this nation. When a man known above 
all for his prudence and caution-, a man who heads a 
conservative and tradition-bound institution like Yale, 
can make such a statement, then all of us are forced to 
face the unpleasant possibility that this is in fact a polit-
ical trial and that fairness is not possible. 
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Our courts, after all, are human institutions, and the 
men who preside in them are subject to the same human 
frailties that beset us all. The danger comes, therefore, 
not from those who criticize the courts but from those 
who assert that the courtroom is a sacred place and that 
no words of reproach or reprimand can properly be dir-
ected toward it-especially not from within the court-
room itself. For if our courts are viewed as sacrosanct 
and untouchable, then they are free to go their own 
way; they are free to disregard the moral sense of the 
community at large. Whenever this happens, the liberties 
of all of us are in grave danger. The moral sense of the 
community is what creates the law and sustains respect 
for the law; and if our courts and prosecutors pursue 
paths of injustice that flout too openly the moral sensi-
tivities of the people, there can be no respect for law, 
and the ultimate result can only be anarchy. 
We have been asked, therefore, to make a response to 
this situation-to express clearly to the courts the deeply 
held feeling of the community and of the university that 
this trial must be fair. We have been asked to warn them 
that-from the various signs we have seen-this may not 
be a fair trial. But some in the law school have resisted 
the call to make a response, to take what is after all a 
moral position on these events. Some among us have 
said-"Don't disturb our routine-don't disturb our 
classes-don't disturb our study time-don't let politics 
interfere with our scholarly pursuits." And some were 
shocked and dismayed when a group of undergraduates 
held teach-ins here yesterday morning and caused short 
interruptions in the classroom routine. Some have said 
that we must have peace above all and that there is no 
justification for interrupting business as usual. What they 
do not understand is that there can be no business as 
usual until the business is right; what they do not under-
stand is that there can be no peace until there is peace 
for everyone. For peace is not merely the absence of 
violence. If that is the kind of peace you want, a Hitler 
can give it to you, or a Mussolini-they were experts, 
after all, at providing order. But far from the mere ab-
sence of violence, peace is the attainment of justice for 
all people. Gentlemen may cry "Peace, Peace"-but 
there is no peace; and there will not be, to borrow one 
of Dr. King's favorite phrases, "till justice flows down 
like water, and righteousness like an everlasting stream." 
So our routine has been interrupted, and some of us 
are disturbed. But I invite you to consider just what the 
routine has been for black people in this country-not a 
century ago under slavery, not a half century ago under 
Jim Crow, not a decade ago under Bull Connor-but 
what that routine has been in our own time, right now, 
and what it continues to be in nearly every corner of this 
nation. ls justice part of the routine for the average 
black citizen in Watts or Mississippi or Harlem or Dix-
well? Is peace part of his daily routine? Answer those 
questions, and then decide how much value you put on 
maintaining the routine. 
Now the weekend that we've been talking about for 
months is upon us, and we are about to witness what 
many believe will be a tragic confrontation. Many pre-
dict violence, and there very well may be violence. But 
the more we dwell on violence-the more we talk about 
its possibility-the more inflamed our own conversations 
become and the greater the chance that there will be 
violence. Many of you are talking about leaving town 
this weekend, but I believe that that would be a mistake. 
If people who believe in rational discourse-who are 
committed to non-violence, who stand for stability and 
order-leave, then the field is wide open to those who 
seek to follow a violent path. If the influence of the 
responsible is removed, then we abandon the field to the 
irresponsible. To leave New Haven this weekend would 
not be an act of prudence or an act of cowardice. It 
would be an act of moral abdication. You would be say-
ing, This is no affair of mine; I have no interest here; my 
presence here would make no difference.' On the con-
trary, your presence here might make all the difference 
in the world. We can, by the example we set, help to set 
the tone of the weekend. We can see to it that it will be 
a time of honest and responsible demonstration of sin-
cerely-held opinions; or we can-by abandoning leader-
ship to the wielders of inflammatory rhetoric-insure 
that the confrontation will be ugly and that the violence 
will be widespread. That frightens me perhaps more ,than 
it frightens you. For I know that in any such confronta-
tion, it will be black people who will bear the brunt of 
the police reaction. 
So 1 close with a quotation that is appropriate both to 
our response to the trial of black American citizens and 
to our conduct during the mass demonstrations of the 
coming weekend. It is a quotation from Martin Niemol-
ler, the German Lutheran pastor who helped lead the 
resistance against the Nazi cancer during Hitler's years in 
power. He spoke about a simple concept, guilt: 'First 
·they came after the Jews.' 'I wasn't a Jew, and I said 
nothing. Then they came after the Roman Catholics. I 
was not a Catholic, and I said nothing. They came for 
the labor union leaders. I was not a union member, and I 
said nothing. They attacked the liberal lawyers, the writ-
ers, the heads of universities. I was none of these, and I 
remained silent. Then they came for the Protestant cler-
gy, and there was no one left to say anything.' 
Speaking for myself, I can only say that now is not the 
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